I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, I authored what I intended as a comprehensive paper on the "unconventional" aspects of informed consent, largely focusing on matters more personal to the "disclosing" physician. 1 Since that time, other authors have commented on these matters. 2 As the law of informed consent has developed, courts have recently considered different informed consent issues unrelated to the typical required disclosure. In light of these decisions, I have concluded that it is time to revisit the unconventional and other selected topics of informed consent.
II. A DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
At the outset, it should be noted, medicine and law have conflicting opinions about the gist of informed consent. I have written "that medicine views informed consent as a communicative process with patient involvement." 3 The law of informed consent largely recognizes consent as a disclosure doctrine; the best evidence of which is the well-known Canterbury v. Spence, footnote 36: 4 We discard the thought that the patient should ask for information before the physician is required to disclose. Caveat emptor is not the norm for the consumer of medical services. Duty to disclose is more than a call to speak merely on the patient's request, or merely to answer the patient's questions; it is a duty to volunteer, if necessary, the information the patient needs for intelligent decision. The patient may be ignorant, confused, overawed by the physician or frightened by the hospital, or even ashamed to inquire. Perhaps relatively few patients could in any event identify the relevant questions in the absence of prior explanation by the physician. Physicians and hospitals have patients of widely divergent socio-economic backgrounds, and a rule which presumes a degree of sophistication which many members of society lack is likely to breed gross inequities. 5 The distinction between the medical and legal models of informed consent is significant. For example, if a patient is involved in a conversation with a physician about a proposed procedure or treatment and asks the physician for information which the physician misrepresents, the patient may have a misrepresentation claim, not an informed consent claim. 6 However, a physician's failure to make a required disclosure yields an informed consent claim.
III. INFORMED CONSENT-MYTH OR REALITY?
Before navigating the boundaries of informed consent, I should confess my concern that true informed consent is a fiction. While I have previously written on this topic, 7 I am certainly not a pioneer in this area. Informed consent has been explored and subjected to legal and medical Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1260 (10th Cir. 2010) (predicting that "the Wyoming Supreme Court would allow an informed consent claim where a physician lies to a patent as to physician-specific information in direct response to a patient's questions concerning the same in the course of obtaining the patient's consent and the questions seek concrete verifiable facts." (emphasis omitted)).
7. Ginsberg, supra note 1.
scholarship for quite some time. 8 My point is that a patient's time with a physician is brief; 9 the general literacy rate in the United States is not particularly impressive;
10 the health literacy rate is lower yet; 11 and many patients prefer not to participate in the healthcare decision-making. 12 These facts redirect the physician-patient relationship to medical paternalism, the first target of the law of informed consent. My skepticism aside, informed consent is an important and developing constituent of medical-legal jurisprudence. These developments merit scrutiny and the remainder of this paper focuses on these topics.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE INFORMED CONSENT CLAIM

A. Informed Consent vs. Medical Battery
It is difficult to imagine that 60 years have passed from what is believed to be the first reported informed consent judicial opinion. 13 Since that holding, courts are required to explain the distinction between claims sounding in medical battery and claims in informed consent. For example, battery is an intentional tort.
14 Medical battery occurs when a patient receives unauthorized, unconsented treatment. 15 In contrast, an informed consent claim arises when a physician fails to properly disclose information to a patient that consented to treatment. 16 
Lounsbury v. Capel
17 is a classic medical battery case. Lounsbury, a construction worker, sustained a work related "compression fracture to one of the vertebrae in his back." 18 Lounsbury suffered "a herniated disc which was impinging on Lounsbury's nerves and causing him pain." 19 His doctor suggested surgery but Lounsbury desired a second opinion, resulting in a referral to the defendant, Dr. Capel.
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals reveals that Lounsbury twice refused to consent to surgery as he had not been advised of the results of a pre-operative myelogram 20 and desired to speak with the surgeon preoperatively. Apparently, Dr. Capel coerced Lounsbury's wife to consent for him while he was unconscious. "She assumed that [her husband] had talked to Dr. Capel and had agreed to the surgery following review of the myelogram." 21 Lounsbury commenced a lawsuit for civil battery against Dr. Capel. The trial court incorrectly concluded that Utah's informed consent statute governed Lounsbury's claim against Dr. Capel for failure to obtain informed consent. 22 The trial court also stated Lounsbury could not establish the requisite elements of the claim 23 and entered Judgment against Dr. Capel.
On appeal, the court of appeals noted the difference between informed consent and battery claims. 24 The court of appeals importantly stated:
It appears well settled that the battery theory remains applicable where a medical treatment or procedure is completely unauthorized. . . . [W] e find nothing in case law or secondary sources to suggest that the doctrine of informed consent has displaced the common law remedy of battery in cases of no consent. 25 The court of appeals held that Lounsbury had a viable medical battery Fractures [https://perma.cc/TQQ8-AEXG] ("VCFs occur when the bony block or vertebral body in the spine collapses, which can lead to severe pain, deformity and loss of height.").
19. claim. Thus, the trial court's judgment in favor of Dr. Capel was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
26
Despite the seemingly clear distinction between medical battery and informed consent claims, the distinction needs to be clearer to courts and counsel representing medical negligence claimants. Courts of last resort have recently been required to re-educate counsel about the distinction. 27 Therefore, a battery claim involving a patient's consent to surgical procedure-allegedly performed incorrectly on the patient-implicated medical negligence, not battery, 28 and an alleged failure to inform a patient of all risks of a consented-to surgical procedure is, similarly, not a battery.
29
B. Misrepresentation vs. Informed Consent
Assume that during a physician's typical informed consent disclosure, the patient interrupts to inquire of the physician's experience or credentials. In response to the patient's inquiry, the physician knowingly provides false information to the patient. Will the physician's misrepresentation provide the predicate for an informed consent claim?
Not surprisingly, there is no consensus answer to this question. Fraudulent misrepresentation claims commonly do not involve personal injuries, 30 yet an action sounding in fraud under this factual scenario has been endorsed.
31
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a physician's misrepresentation of his surgical experience "in response to a specific question posed by [a patient]" 32 did not yield an informed consent claim but instead a claim for misrepresentation. 33 The court took the position that "information personal to the physician, whether solicited by the patient or not, is irrelevant to the doctrine of informed consent" 34 all damages arising out of any type of malfeasance by a physician."
35
In 2002, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a physician's misrepresentation of his credentials as a board certified physician in response to a specific inquiry (by the patient's wife) would not support a fraud claim, but would support an informed consent claim. 36 The court emphasized that the "misrepresented or exaggerated physician experience would have to significantly increase a risk of a procedure in order for it to affect the judgment of a reasonably prudent patient in an informed consent case."
37
The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit weighed in on this topic in Willis v. Bender. 38 In Willis, a patient sued a general surgeon for medical negligence as he allegedly perforated the patient's small bowel during a laparoscopic gallbladder removal. 39 During the meeting in which the patient's history was taken and surgical options were discussed, the patient:
asked Bender about his experience and track record with the laparoscopic procedure, whether he had ever been sued and whether he had ever had any problems with his medical license. Bender told [the patient] he had never been sued, never had any problems with his medical license and his success rate with the laparoscopic procedure was "99.9% right on the mark." 40 Postoperatively, the patient learned that her surgeon provided her false information about prior lawsuits filed against him. He "had in fact been sued several times, including by a family of a patient who had died after undergoing a laparoscopic cholecystectomy performed by Bender in 2001." 41 Essentially, this case focused on the issue of whether a physician may lie to a patient "and then use that false information to secure a patient's consent." 42 The court of appeals noted that the medical negligence claim was based on diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, the informed consent issue must be resolved pursuant to Wyoming law and the court "must attempt 35 Wyoming law permitted an informed consent claim to be based on a misrepresentation of the risks of treatment, 45 but the court of appeals identified a split of authority on the issue of whether a physician "had a duty to truthfully answer . . . physician specific questions." 46 After reviewing available authority from other jurisdictions, the court of appeals predicted that the Wyoming Supreme Court would recognize an informed consent claim because the defendant-physician's "alleged misrepresentations to [Plaintiff] in response to her direct questions allegedly induced her to consent to the surgery and its risks." 47 The misrepresentations must be in response to "questions seek[ing] concrete verifiable facts, not the doctor's subjective opinion or judgment as to the quality of his performance or abilities."
48
Is the distinction between an informed consent claim based on a negligent non-disclosure and one based on a fraudulent misrepresentation an irrelevant difference? Certainly, a court could simply pronounce that all material non-disclosures and misrepresentations, whether or not responding to patient inquiries, will provide the predicate for an informed consent claim. It should be remembered that classic fraudulent misrepresentation claims do not require the establishment of a professional standard of care and the use of expert witnesses. Therefore, when analyzing an informed consent claim a court should consider the physician's disclosure to the patient, whether or not the patient inquires of the physician. This type of analysis eliminates the problem of having to expand the doctrine to include the subject matter of the patient's inquiry; inquiries typically not covered by the doctrine-physician specific, personal information. Their claims, including lack of informed consent, were filed in a federal court in Alabama. The defendants successfully moved for summary judgment, 53 urging "that Plaintiffs had failed to prove that their injuries were caused by participation in the . . . study, as opposed to being a consequence of their premature births."
C. Free Standing Informed Consent
54
On appeal, the court of appeals framed the free-standing informed consent claim as follows:
As far as we can tell, however, Alabama law has yet to explicitly address the question whether proof of a medical injury is also required before a plaintiff can claim that his consent to a medical procedure was not informed. Specifically, if a plaintiff cannot prove that he suffered any injury as a result of a particular medical procedure, can he still potentially prevail if he shows that the doctor failed to obtain his informed consent to that procedure? In other words, is there a freestanding tort arising from a lack of informed consent, even if there is no injury resulting from the procedure at issue? 55 The court of appeals certified the case to the Alabama Supreme Court for guidance insofar as "Alabama law . . . does not expressly tell us whether such an informed consent claim is subject to the same requirements as a 49 56 The court of appeals looked to inconsistencies in Alabama law as well as the law of other jurisdictions in concluding that Alabama law was unsettled.
The following question was, therefore, certified to the Alabama Supreme Court:
Must a patient whose particular medical treatment is dictated by the parameters of a clinical study, and who has not received adequate warnings of the risks of that particular protocol, prove that an injury actually resulted from the medical treatment in order to succeed on a claim that his consent to the procedure was not informed? 57 The court of appeals noted the certified question should be limited to treatment in the context of a clinical study. 77 Jarrell's friend referred him to a neurosurgeon. After evaluating Jarrell, the neurosurgeon "concluded that Dr. Kaul improperly placed some screws that pinched a nerve causing the pain and drop foot." 78 The neurosurgeon performed a reparative procedure, but postoperatively, Jarrell continued to have pain and limited physical activity.
79
Jarrell and his wife brought a multi-count claim against Dr. Kaul and the surgical center where Dr. Kaul served as Medical Director.
80 Among the claims Jarrell filed, one was for lack of informed consent, urging that Dr. Kaul "knew that he was uninsured at the time he obtained Jarrell's consent to perform surgery," 81 and that Dr. Kaul should have disclosed his uninsured status to Jarrell as it "would have been significant in [Jarrell's] decision making." 82 Dr. Kaul argued "that a physician's duty to obtain informed consent from a patient prior to undertaking medical treatment is limited to the risks associated with the treatment, not whether a patient may have a source to pay a monetary judgment in the event the physician negligently discharges his professional duties."
83
The New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the origin of the doctrine of informed consent, by referring to an eighteenth century English opinion. 84 The court stated, "there is reliable evidence that medical informed consent dates back to ancient times." 85 Furthermore, after noting that the doctrine contemplates "a disclosure of the risks associated with the recommended procedure and alternative procedures or therapies;" 86 the court concluded that the disclosure of "whether [a physician] maintains medical malpractice liability insurance, . . . is . . . 'not a perfect fit' with our informed consent jurisprudence." 87 The court noted that a physician's lack of professional liability insurance does not necessarily derive from the physician's lack of skill.
88 However, they did not address the issue of whether an uninsured physician is more or less likely to practice medicine carefully. Accordingly, the court decided that a financial loss sustained by a patient "is not the injury that the informed consent doctrine ever contemplated." 89 The dissenting/concurring opinion clearly tethers the defendantphysician's financial insecurity to his competence (incompetence), 90 and referred to the case facts as "present[ing] the quintessential case of lack of informed consent."
91
Without any citation to authority, the dissent/concurrence further states:
A patient has a right to know whether a physician performing a procedure is in a financially responsible position in the event that the patient suffers injuries due to medical malpractice. A reasonable patient would consider a physician's lack of insurance a material factor in making a decision whether to have spinal surgery. That is so because an uninsured physician provides no financial safety net for a patient who is harmed by the physician. Lack of insurance also may suggest that the carrier considered the physician incompetent to perform the procedure.
92
Neither the majority nor dissenting/concurring opinions address the actual risk of the uninsured physician. Is this physician more likely to be careful and avoid mistakes due to the possibility of personal, uninsured liability? Or is the uninsured physician more likely to practice carelessly, or with reckless abandon, on the assumption that the lack of professional 93 It has been urged that there is a risk when addressing an uninsured physician who is a co-defendant with an insured physician in medical negligence litigation. The theory is the plaintiff's counsel will attempt to influence the uninsured co-defendant "to criticize the insured co-defendant physician in deposition or at trial. Refusing to do so subjects the bare physician to aggressive action by the plaintiff's attorney and the potential for financial ruin."
94
Jarrell v. Kaul 95 may not be as cutting edge of an informed consent opinion as much as it is an outlier. The facts of this case involve a boardcertified anesthesiologist who performed a procedure typically performed by a neurosurgeon or orthopedic surgeon in a non-hospital setting. Hospitals routinely require evidence of medical liability coverage as a condition of staff privileges. As an informed consent case, however, the scope of the disclosure cannot be without boundaries. A patient may be interested to know that the procedure to which the patient is about to submit may be negligently performed, yet this is not a disclosable risk. 96 Undoubtedly, other unconventional "risks" could be imagined. The "risk" of the uninsured physician is fairly considered outside the bounds of informed consent, although a debate on this topic is not without merit.
97
B. Abortion
It is an understatement that abortion is a controversial and politically charged topic in the United States. This paper is not the forum in which to address divisive and quite significant legal issues on that topic. 98 However, interesting jurisprudence exists relating to the required physician disclosure in connection with a first trimester abortion. 99 Specifically, the issue is whether the physician is obligated to advise the patient that a first trimester abortion is a procedure which kills an alleged 93 [She] asked a PP counselor whether an abortion would terminate the life of a human being in the biological sense. The counselor replied in the negative. The plaintiff told the counselor that she had been informed by a pregnancy help center that an abortion terminates the life of a human being. The counselor replied that pregnancy help centers often deliberately misrepresent the facts to prospective mothers. The counselor assured her that an abortion did not terminate the life of a human being. Given this assurance, the plaintiff decided to have an abortion that same day.
102
Two years following the abortion, Plaintiff filed suit "individually and on behalf of her aborted fetus . . . against the clinic, its doctors, and its nursing/counseling staff," 103 claiming that "the defendant had a duty to inform her that an abortion 'procedure would terminate the life of a second patient, a living human being as a matter of biological fact.'" 104 Plaintiff claimed that "but for the defendants' failure to fully inform her of the direct and collateral consequences of an abortion, she would not have terminated her pregnancy." 105 The court dismissed the complaint, holding that there was "no duty to inform a patient . . . that an abortion terminates the life of a human being in the biological sense as a matter of law." 106 The appellate court referred to the Illinois common law of informed consent 107 her." 122 Plaintiff's research caused her to conclude "that the abortion procedures killed a 'human being. '" 123 Plaintiff filed a claim "primarily focused on the theory of lack of informed consent."
124 Essentially, Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Turkish did not disclose, among other things, that "abortion involved 'actually killing an existing human being.'" 125 A lengthy procedural history ensued, with the following findings of the trial judge:
• By demanding that a physician advise a pregnant woman that her non-viable embryo "is in all material respects equivalent to a person born and alive," plaintiff would require that the doctor convey "a value judgment not a medical fact."
126
• [Q]uestions of when life begins and whether a woman should terminate a pregnancy "involved moral, philosophical, and religious questions." 127
• "[T]hose trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology" have failed to reach a consensus about when life begins.
128
• The law has left the question of whether to abort or go to term with a non-viable embryo . . . "for each woman to decide for herself."
129
• [A] physician is not required to advise a woman that her non-viable embryo "is a living human being" to obtain her informed consent for an abortion.
130
The state supreme court, after a lengthy discussion of the law of informed consent, concluded that New Jersey's common law did not contemplate the duty to disclose urged by the plaintiff. 131 The court's decision is consistent with the informed consent policy of limiting the required disclosure to medical facts directly related to the proposed procedure or treatment.
C. Detail of a Medical Procedure
Consider this frequent scenario: a patient consults a general surgeon for a commonly performed surgical procedure-hernia repair, appendectomy, or gallbladder removal. The informed consent disclosure 134 but it is simply unreasonable for the surgeon to expect that the patient seek this much detail and have the ability to comprehend it. This puts the surgeon in a difficult situation. It has been urged that the law of informed consent has "made it plain that it is not appropriate to surrender the degree of detail to the sole judgment of the medical profession itself."
135 Yet, an equally cogent and realistic position is that "[t]he real limits of patient . . . comprehension suggest[s] that it is unreasonable to seek consent for every detail of a proposed treatment." 136 What, then, is the obligation of the physician when explaining a medical procedure to a patient?
Oregon, pursuant to statute, has given physicians, in part, a reasonably clear path to the disclosure. Oregon's informed consent statute provides as follows:
ORS § 677.097 Procedure to obtain informed consent of patient (1) In order to obtain the informed consent of a patient, a physician or physician assistant shall explain the following:
(a) In general terms the procedure or treatment to be undertaken; (b) That there may be alternative procedures or methods of treatment, if any; and (c) That there are risks, if any, to the procedure or treatment. (2) After giving the explanation specified in subsection (1) of this section, the physician or physician assistant shall ask the patient if the patient wants a more detailed explanation. If the patient requests further explanation, the physician or physician assistant shall disclose in substantial detail the procedure, the viable alternatives and the material risks unless to do so would be materially detrimental to the patient. In determining that further explanation would be materially detrimental the physician or physician assistant shall give due consideration to the standards of practice of reasonable medical or podiatric practitioners in the same or a similar community under the same or similar circumstances.
137
Pursuant to the statute, the procedure shall be explained in general terms. 138 The statutory requirement then extends beyond the disclosure doctrine for the character of informed consent requires the physician to inquire of the patient if the patient desires additional detail. If the patient opts for more detail, the Oregon informed consent process involves much more of a communication or conversation than contemplated by the classic informed consent doctrine. The Court of Appeals of Oregon in 1990 described the informed consent process. 139 More recently, the Superior Court of Connecticut subscripted to a less detailed description of a surgical procedure when it stated that, "a requirement under the nature of procedure element of the informed consent cases that a doctor describe a surgical procedure in great detail would place an impossible burden on surgeons and make it difficult for reviewing courts to develop guidelines to implement application of this nature of procedure element." 140 Certainly, the amount and depth of detail to be disclosed by the physician is not determinable by a formulaic application. A "general" description of a proposed procedure or treatment seems realistic in terms of time constraints and patient literacy.
D. Non-Physician Participation in Surgical Procedure
Quite recently, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma considered what is, hopefully, an aberrant factual scenario in Hurley v. Kirk. 141 Here, a surgeon allowed a non-physician to perform a portion of a total laparoscopic hysterectomy. 142 The patient consented to the procedure but the surgeon never informed the patient that the person who would assist in surgery had credentials as an EMT, surgical technician, LPN, and first assistant, 143 but not as a physician. During the procedure, the patient suffered various injuries and required corrective surgery. favor of the defendants and the appellate court affirmed. 145 The state supreme court referred to its informed consent jurisprudence in its holding and held that the defendant surgeon owed a duty to the patient to disclose the anticipated participation of a non-physician in the surgical procedure. Specifically, the court stated:
Today, this Court reemphasizes that the scope of a physician's communications must be measured by his/her patient's need to know enough information to enable the patient to make an informed and intelligent choice. In other words, full disclosure of all material risks incident to treatment must be made. As such, no physician has carte blanche to delegate any or all tasks to a non-doctor. To hold otherwise, would obliterate a patient's freedom of choice and reinstate the paternalistic approach to medicine . . . . The scope of the duty to inform is broad enough to include a physician's duty to inform the patient "who" will be performing significant portions of the procedure or surgical tasks.
146
The opinion in Hurley, 147 in light of its facts, is quite reasonable. The non-physician in the surgical procedure increased the patient's risk of surgical injury due to his participation. Accordingly, the patient was entitled to know of this participant in advance of surgery and choose a different surgeon.
E. Physician Personal Life and Personal Decisions
Is a physician obligated to disclose to a patient that the physician is allegedly having an affair with the patient's wife? In 2012, the Court of Appeals of Georgia answered. No. 148 In Witcher v. McGauley, 149 both spouses were patients of the defendant-physician. Prior to the discovery of the alleged affair, the defendant treated the husband-spouse "for complaints including depression and anxiety."
150 The defendantphysician diagnosed husband-spouse "with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), which necessitated prescribing medication."
151 The husbandspouse had advised the defendant-physician "that he thought 'something was not clicking right at home,' which was causing him to have an inability to focus on his work. fiduciary duty claims against the defendant-physician were based in part on the alleged affair and resulting damages-divorce, the need to seek psychiatric care, loss of employment, "mental and physical distress, humiliation, and anguish." 153 The court noted that the defendant-physician "had no duty to disclose to his patient personal life factors, such as an affair, that might adversely affect his professional performance." 154 In Hooks v. Humphries, 155 the Court of Appeals of Georgia considered an informed consent claim arising from a birth injury. During Plaintiff's pre-natal care, her ob-gyn advised her "that he no longer delivered babies, that his medical treatment would be limited to her prenatal care, and that he would refer her to another obstetrician for delivery of the baby."
156 When Plaintiff returned to see the defendant, he advised Plaintiff "that her pregnancy was considered high risk based on her age, her history of smoking, of complications in prior pregnancies, and of failing to comply with doctor's instructions."
157 Her ob-gyn referred Plaintiff to a specialist. 158 At a follow-up visit to the defendant, he advised Plaintiff that she may have gestational diabetes.
159
The defendant ceased to provide care to Plaintiff. Other physicians cared for the Plaintiff and, ultimately, she gave birth to a large baby, which, "[d]uring the delivery . . . sustained a shoulder dystocia, 160 Erb's palsy, 161 and meconium aspiration syndrome Plaintiff commenced a medical negligence lawsuit against the defendant, which resulted in a defense verdict at trial. 164 The trial court previously granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant in 153 connection with a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 165 The essence of that claim was the defendant's failure "to disclose to [Plaintiff] the reasons he no longer delivered babies." 166 Apparently, Plaintiff's counsel approached the topic during the defendant's deposition, when he "testified that he no longer practiced in labor and delivery for 'mostly personal and some political reasons.'" 167 The court of appeals easily disposed of Plaintiff's claim regarding the non-disclosure. It held that a "physician has no duty to voluntarily disclose negative information 168 about his personal life to patients . . . even if the patient indicates that the information would have [been] useful in determining whether to seek treatment elsewhere." 169 Additionally, the court of appeals indicated that the disclosure of personal matters was not included in "the specific categories of information set forth in Georgia's informed consent statute." 170 Plaintiff's claim in Hooks surely defies logic. Once Plaintiff's physician advised her of the factors complicating her pregnancy, including gestational diabetes, a referral to a maternal-fetal medicine specialist 171 was realistic. The defendant-physician very likely would not have undertaken the delivery even if he had not opted to no longer deliver babies. The non-disclosure did not increase any risk to the patient. Thus, her claim was without merit.
F. Physician Health History
Physicians are patients, too, 172 and, therefore, are entitled to health information privacy. 173 However, a physician's health history could create risk to patients, particularly if the physician's health is compromised and might impact the ability to provide quality care. Is the physician under an obligation to disclose this disease or disability to the patient in order to obtain the patient's informed consent? Recent jurisprudence speaks to this 165 Plaintiff experienced significant postoperative complications requiring follow-up medical and surgical care. 179 Plaintiff filed a medical negligence claim based on the lack of informed consent. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant-physician.
On appeal, the court referred to the Louisiana informed consent statute 180 noting that "a doctor's duty of disclosure to a patient includes only those risks that are material." 181 The court then noted the following significant, "undisputed facts": 182
Plaintiff's postoperative "complications were known and material risks that might have been expected from the surgery";
183 Plaintiff "was advised of [a postoperative] risk and consented to the surgery"; 184 and the defendant-physician "was released by his doctor to perform acts in his medical practice."
185 The court's comments suggest that the informed consent disclosure was appropriate and the defendant-physician's prior eye condition and surgery did not constitute a risk to the patient.
Finally, the court made an important distinction between a classic medical negligence claim and an informed consent claim pertaining to the case facts as follows: "[A] physician's inability to perform surgery because of his impaired physical condition is not a matter concerning informed consent of the patient but negligence of the physician. suggests that a physician is simply not obligated to disclose personal health information to obtain a patient's informed consent, even if the physician's health would pose a risk to the patient. Presumably, a patient injured as a result of medical negligence caused by the physician's impaired health will learn of the impairment during the pre-trial discovery process. Of course, this provides little, if any, consolation to a patient who might well have opted for a different physician. Another recent examination of an informed consent claim involving the defendant-physician's health occurred in Rice v. Brakel. 187 This case involved a spinal surgery performed by a physician with an apparent prescription pain medication dependency. 188 The patient came across this information while researching 'the Board of Medical Examiners' website to check the disciplinary history of a doctor licensed in the state."
189 This research also revealed that the defendant-physician "had been reprimanded by the board and placed on probation for five years."
190
Plaintiff filed a claim for medical battery, medical malpractice and negligent supervision. The trial court entered summary judgment on behalf of the defendant-physician. On appeal, the court discussed all of these theories. Insofar as the alleged failure of the defendant-physician to disclose his alleged drug dependence and disciplinary history is concerned, the court stated that " [Plaintiff] has an available cause of action for any damages caused by [defendant's] failure to disclose, because the duty to disclose relevant risks already exists under the informed consent theory of medical malpractice."
191 Nevertheless, the court also found that Plaintiff had not introduced any evidence to prove "that he would have declined the treatment had [defendant's] status been disclosed" 192 or that the non-disclosure proximately caused any injury.
193
The Court of Appeals of Georgia in Williams v. Booker addressed a surgeon's alcohol addiction. 194 Here, the court reviewed the denial of defendants' motions for summary judgment pertaining to this addiction. The defendant-physician had performed a laparoscopic gallbladder removal 195 The court addressed the relevance of defendant's addiction, stating that "[i]n medical malpractice suits, evidence of a physicians' alcohol or drug use or addiction is relevant and admissible only when there is evidence from which the jury may infer that the physician was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the allegedly negligent treatment."
200 Of course, the relevance analysis did not address the issue of disclosure to obtain informed consent.
As to the informed consent claim against the hospital, the court noted that Plaintiff provided no authority to support his claim that the hospital had a duty to inform the patient of a physician's alcoholism. The court cited to Georgia jurisprudence holding "that a physician has no duty to inform a patient of his use and dependence upon the illegal drug cocaine." 201 Therefore, there was "no basis for [Plaintiff's] failure-todisclose claim." 202 Such a claim could not be prosecuted against the physician or hospital.
Informed consent claims concerning physician health implicate sensitive and controversial matters. The most reasonable approach would support a required disclosure if the physician's health condition creates a realistic risk to the patient which would not exist in the absence of that condition.
G. Physician's Relationship with Medical Product Manufacturer and Financial Interest in Treatment Procedure
In Shapira v. Christiana Care Health Services, Inc.
203
, the Supreme Court of Delaware considered the appeal from a verdict in favor of the defense in a medical negligence claim involving a thoracic surgeon who had a financial interest in a product which was used to treat the plaintiff. Plaintiff "fell from a ladder and suffered multiple non-displaced rib fractures, among other injuries." 204 Plaintiff was hospitalized and attended to by defendant, a thoracic surgeon, who performed a pain management procedure (called an On-Q procedure) where the surgeon inserted a catheter over Plaintiff's ribs through which pain medication was delivered. 205 The use of the catheter in this procedure was not FDA approved, constituting "an 'off-label' use of the . . . catheter."
206
In advance of the procedure, the surgeon would have discussed it with the patient, including its purpose, "aims, risks and alternatives." 207 The patient consented to the procedure. However, the surgeon did not disclose his "independent interest in the . . . procedure." 208 The court explained the surgeon's "interest" in great detail, as follows.
In 2007, Shapira entered into a contract with the On-Q's manufacturer, I-Flow Corporation, under which Shapira became a member of I-Flow's speaker's bureau. I-Flow paid Shapira to give presentations to other physicians about the On-Q procedure, and Shapira created a promotional pamphlet about the procedure. Also in 2007, Shapira created a database at Christiana Hospital to collect information about his patients' responses to the On-Q procedure. Around that time, the number of patients on whom Shapira performed the On-Q procedure began to increase significantly. In 2009, Shapira requested and received approval from CCHS's Institutional Review Board ("IRB") to study the effectiveness of the On-Q procedure using the patient data he was collecting. By mid-2009, Shapira had labeled himself, in addition to a thoracic surgeon, an "interventional pain management physician" based on his frequent performance of the On-Q procedure at Christiana Hospital. 209 Additionally, and significantly, the surgeon only discussed oral and intravenous pain medication as an alternative and did not discuss epidural anesthesia as an option. additional surgical procedures. 211 Plaintiff brought a medical negligence action against the physician including a claim for informed consent. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
212
The state supreme court characterized the informed consent claim as implicating a conflict of interest, specifically, that the physician-defendant failed "to disclose significant personal conflicts of interest regarding the On-Q procedure, including his business relationship with I-Flow." 213 The court referred to Delaware's informed consent statute which defined informed consent as follows:
[T]he consent of a patient to the performance of health care services by a health care provider given after the health care provider has informed the patient, to an extent reasonably comprehensible to general lay understanding, of the nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of the risks and alternatives to treatment or diagnosis which a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision whether or not to undergo the treatment or diagnosis.
214
The statute would have required the defendant-physician to present the Plaintiff with an alternative method of pain management, which he did not do. Thus the defendant-physician violated the standard of care.
215
As to the surgeon's financial connection to the pain management procedure he performed, the court found his connection created a conflict of interest such that he performed a procedure which benefitted him, "not because it was the most appropriate procedure." 216 Furthermore, "the conflict created a risk that [he] did not disclose or consider all reasonable alternatives." 217 The surgeon had the incentive to "play down the risks of the . . . procedure and play up the problems with alternative treatments."
218 Therefore, the non-disclosure increased the risk to the patient receiving the procedure which might have been avoided had the patient known of another option. financial interest related to a proposed treatment beyond just the compensation the physician charges for the medical services rendered. The financial conflict places a patient at risk of unnecessary medical care or of more dangerous treatment than necessary.
H. Off Label Use of Surgical Device
In Seavey v. Globus Medical, 220 the court considered various motions for summary judgment in product liability and lack of informed consent claims relating to the use of a surgical fixation device. 221 The surgeon's use of the device was "off-label"-a use not approved by the FDA. The surgeon did not disclose the off-label use of the device to the patient when obtaining the patient's consent for the surgical procedure.
Typically, non-disclosure of an off-label use of a medical device does not violate the doctrine of informed consent. 222 The Seavey trial judge recognized this principle when he stated:
[W]hen a surgeon uses a medical device in an "off-label" manner, a failure to disclose that information to the patient is, alone, insufficient to support a claim that the physician failed to meet the applicable disclosure standard.. . . "the FDA regulatory status 'do[es] not speak directly to the medical issues surrounding a particular surgery.'" This is the case because the FDA's "concern is to regulate the marketing and labelling of medical devices, not to intrude upon the practice of medicine or redefine the doctrine of informed consent." Doctors may "use medical devices for off-label purposes that are not FDA approved, provided that the FDA has approved the device for some other purpose." 223 The court also confirmed that New Jersey law was consistent with this principle. 224 The court, however, did not pronounce a per se rule regarding the non-disclosure of the FDA regulatory status of a surgical device. It is possible that FDA regulatory status could recognize a risk to a patient through an off-label use. If so, that status must be disclosed by the physician in order to obtain the patient's informed consent. 225 In addition, in order to prove the materiality of that risk, the patient must produce expert testimony. 226 Plaintiff did not produce that testimony.
I. Differential Diagnosis-Proper Diagnosis
Not long ago, I authored a detailed paper on informed consent and the differential diagnosis. 227 The paper examined the experiences of various jurisdictions and urged that physicians cannot be expected to disclose the entire differential diagnosis and treatment options (including risks, benefits and complications) for discarded diagnoses. 228 It also urged that a doctrine of informed consent which required the disclosure of the differential diagnosis could yield unnecessary medical procedures and pose danger to patients. 229 The failure of a physician to arrive at a correct diagnosis should yield a medical negligence claim, not an informed consent claim.
230
J. Physician Experience
Are patients better served by receiving treatment from more experienced rather than less experienced physicians? It has been reported that "[e]xperience is strongly related to better outcomes in surgery and obstetrics, but studies examining association between physician experience and quality of care for medical patients have reported mixed results."
231 If physician experience is related to outcome, does inexperience or less experience constitute a material risk to a patient which the physician is obligated to disclose? In other words, is a physician required to disclose to a patient that a more experienced physician is available and preferable?
In 2017, the Court of Appeals of Iowa, in Andersen v. Khanna, 232 held that no "Iowa court has explicitly considered whether the doctor's inexperience is a material risk or factor that falls within the duty to disclose." 233 The court referred to the Iowa informed consent statute 234 and stated that it "is silent as to any physician-specific information that must be disclosed to meet the informed-consent requirements." 235 Therefore, under Iowa law, the defendant's alleged inexperience (as a cardiac surgeon) could not support an informed consent claim. The court of appeals decision was, however, short-lived. In 2018, on further review by the Supreme Court of Iowa, the Andersen decision was vacated. 236 The state supreme court focused on the fact that the defendantphysician did not have any experience or training in performing the particular Bentall procedure 237 used on Andersen. 238 Insofar as Iowa had adopted a reasonable patient model of informed consent, 239 the Supreme Court held that a physician's personal characteristics, including experience, can be material to a patient's decision to undertake treatment. 240 The Supreme Court's specific holding is as follows:
Accordingly, we hold a physician's experience or training with the proposed treatment can be information material to the decision of a reasonable person in the patient's position to or not to undergo the proposed treatment. Whether such information is material will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and will be for the jury to decide, unless as a matter of law no reasonable person in the patient's position would find such information material.
241
Of course, the position taken by the Iowa Supreme Court potentially places many Iowa physicians in peril. There is always a more experienced physician. How much (or little) experience is material to a reasonable patient? How will less experienced physicians gain experience if they must routinely disclose their experience and, presumably, the identities of more experienced physicians?
In 244 resulting in complications. 245 This resulted in additional hand surgery, during which "defendant discovered that he had severed Plaintiff's common digital nerve 246 in the previous endoscopic procedure, and performed microscopic repair on the nerve."
247 Postoperatively, the complications remained.
Plaintiff's complaint, including an informed consent claim, alleged "that defendant never informed her that his experience with performing endoscopic CTR surgery consisted of less than ten percent of all surgical procedures that he routinely performed."
248 Plaintiff claimed that if she was aware of defendant's inexperience and the surgical risks she would not have consented.
249
The informed consent claim went to trial and resulted in a jury verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed. The surgeon's "non-disclosure" was not a misrepresentation of his credentials. 250 The surgeon did not, under New Jersey law, have an obligation to disclose his surgical experience to obtain the patient's informed consent.
K. Sophisticated Care Facility
A question related to the prior section: Does the doctrine of informed consent require a physician to disclose to the patient the option of seeking treatment at a facility which can provide more sophisticated care? In Torres v. Carrese, 251 the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that this disclosure is not required.
In Torres, 252 Plaintiff, an obstetrical patient, sued obstetriciangynecologists after delivering a child via cesarean hysterectomy. The delivery became complicated by a placental condition (placental percreta) in addition to bleeding. Thus, the plaintiff-patient required a hysterectomy and urologic treatment. 253 The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Plaintiff's informed consent claim, which alleged that the defendant should have disclosed "that the cesarean hysterectomy could perhaps be more safely performed at another health care facility." 254 The appellate court affirmed, stating:
None of our courts have addressed a claim closely analogous to the plaintiff's-that is, whether a physician has an obligation to inform his or her patient that a procedure may be better performed at another health care facility. We hold that on the facts presented in this case, [defendant] had no such obligation. . . . The procedure itself does not necessarily extend to the place where the procedure is to be performed; in the circumstances of this case, the alleged fact that the facility was not a tertiary facility was not, as a matter of law, a material risk.
255
The appellate court, however, did not preempt possible informed consent claims, based on different facts, founded on the non-disclosure of alternative treatment venues. 256 The difficulty here is the notion that a less sophisticated treatment facility (and its personnel) may constitute a material risk to a patient. For example, is a community-based physician required to disclose that a patient would be better served at a university teaching facility? The point is that there is almost always, a "better" facility based on reputation, prestige, credentials of staff physicians, and available training programs. It is simply not possible for every patient to be referred to a more sophisticated facility. Instead, the failure of a physician to make an appropriate referral may constitute medical negligence. Yet "failure" does not fit well with an informed consent claim.
L. Disciplinary History
It is well known that disciplinary action against a physician by a state medical licensing board rarely relates to quality of care issues. 257 When disciplinary action does result from poor medical care, is the disciplined physician obligated to disclose this disciplinary history to obtain a patient's informed consent? Does this disciplinary action create a risk to patients? A recent trial court opinion speaks to this issue.
In McBreairty v. Body Cosmetica, 258 the trial court considered a motion to strike an informed consent claim focusing on a plastic surgeon's alleged failure to disclose "that his medical license in New York had been subject to discipline, and that his medical license was on probation in Connecticut at the time of the initial consultation [with the patient]."
259
Plaintiff also alleged the surgeon's non-disclosure of required retraining, surgical monitoring, consent orders as to his Connecticut medical license, and various "complaints lodged against him over the years for reasons relating to patient safety and/or his skills as a plastic surgeon." 260 Plaintiff also alleged that the defendant failed to inform her of the risks and complications of breast augmentation surgery.
261
The court reviewed the Connecticut law of informed consent, referring to the Duffy v. Flagg 262 factors, including "the risks and hazards of the procedure," 263 and stated that Plaintiff's "allegations certainly contain provider specific information which a jury could conclude would be 'material to a reasonable patient' so as to trigger a duty to disclose." Here, an attending surgeon and a resident, supervised by the attending performed an eye surgery on a patient. 267 Surgical complications occurred. Allegedly the patient was non-compliant with the surgeon's medication recommendations. The patient then had subsequent unsuccessful surgical procedures and lost her vision in one eye. 
N. Cost of Treatment
Currently, there are no reported judicial opinions on the topic of financial informed consent-the required disclosure to the patient of the cost of recommended treatment. However, this topic has not escaped scrutiny in medical and legal scholarship. 271 It has been urged that physicians have an ethical duty to engage patients in discussion of the cost of treatment 272 because financial informed consent is a component of patient autonomy. 273 Various explanations have been advanced for why medical providers do not typically obtain a patient's financial informed consent:
• [P]hysicians typically lack accurate information about the cost of treatment.
274
• Long-standing professional norms prevent discussion of fees before a physician cares for the sick.
275
• Enormous accounting complexity causes both providers and patients to lack the capacity to negotiate and assent to a bill. doctor and patient is part-and-parcel of healthcare services. Thus, regardless of whether a patient ultimately receives the correct diagnosis or medically acceptable treatment, that patient has been denied the equal opportunity to participate in healthcare services whenever he or she cannot communicate medically relevant information effectively with medical staff. 278 The concept of financial informed consent is consistent with this principle. 279 
VI. DELEGABILITY OF DISCLOSURE
In a recent opinion, which profoundly impacts the Pennsylvania law of informed consent, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a physician may not delegate the duty to obtain a patient's informed consent to a surgical procedure. 280 Shinal v. Toms concerned a medical negligence action arising from a neurosurgical procedure to remove "a recurrent nonmalignant tumor from the pituitary region of [Plaintiff's] brain." 281 Various surgical options were available, 282 involving total or less than total removal.
The Plaintiff decided to have surgery but, following a meeting with the defendant, "the surgical approach had not yet been determined." 283 During that meeting, the defendant-physician reviewed "the alternatives, risks, and benefits of total versus subtotal resection." 284 Thereafter, Plaintiff had a telephone conversation and a meeting with the defendantphysician's physician assistant (PA). 285 290 and the defendant-physician's position, "that, while it is the physician's duty to obtain the patient's informed consent, the physician is not required to supply all of the information personally." 291 The Pennsylvania informed consent statute, in relevant part, provides as follows:
(a) Duty of physicians. Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain the informed consent of the patient or the patient's authorized representative prior to conducting the following procedures:
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anes thesia. (b) Description of procedure. Consent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure. The physician shall be entitled to present evidence of the description of that procedure and those risks and alternatives that a physician acting in accordance with accepted medical standards of medical practice would provide.
292
The text of the statute clearly notes that the duty to obtain informed consent is owed by the physician-the statute is silent on the issue of delegability of the duty. Nevertheless, the state supreme court emphasized "that the duty to obtain informed consent belongs solely to the physician 286 and that it is non-delegable."
293 Furthermore, the court, in recognizing informed consent as more than a disclosure doctrine, stated:
[W]e hold that a physician cannot rely upon a subordinate to disclose the information required to obtain informed consent. Without direct dialogue and a two-way exchange between the physician and patient, the physician cannot be confident that the patient comprehends the risks, benefits, likelihood of success and alternatives. 294 Were the law to permit physicians to delegate the provision of critical information to staff, it would undermine patient autonomy and bodily integrity by depriving the patient of the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with his or her chosen health care provider. A regime that would countenance delegation of the informed consent process would undermine the primacy of the physician-patient relationship. Only by personally satisfying the duty of disclosure may the physician ensure that consent truly is informed.
295
Of course, the Pennsylvania informed consent statute, even if presumably requiring the non-delegable disclosure by the physician, simply does not suggest an informed consent dialogue, discussion, or conversation. The court in Shinal has engrafted that process on to the statute by judicial interpretation and stated, "[i]nformed consent requires direct communication between physician and patient, and contemplates a back-and-forth, face-to-face exchange, which might include questions that the patient feels the physician must answer personally before the patient feels informed and becomes willing to consent." 296 It will be interesting to determine if the Shinal opinion influences other courts to adopt its interpretation of the doctrine of informed consent, expanding it beyond a disclosure doctrine. How a court is able to analyze the communication process and patient understanding remains to be seen.
VII. REFERRING PHYSICIAN AND INFORMED CONSENT
On appeal from a denial of a physician's motion for summary judgment, a New York state appellate court recently pronounced that a referring physician may be subject to an informed consent claim. cannot be liable on a claim for lack of informed consent because he was merely a referring physician." 299 This argument failed on appeal as "unpersuasive in light of the evidence that he comanaged plaintiff's care and that the Lasik surgeon specifically relied upon Dr. Liberatore's examination to clear Plaintiff for the surgery." 300 The brief opinion in Odoardi provides no specific analysis as to how a non-operating physician would obtain informed consent for a procedure he did not perform. Of concern would be the possibility of inconsistent disclosures by multiple physicians and patient confusion.
VIII. AN EVIDENTIARY ISSUE: ADMISSIBILITY OF THE INFORMED CONSENT DISCLOSURE IN A NON-INFORMED CONSENT MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
Quite recently, courts have considered an interesting evidentiary issue. Are the details of an informed consent disclosure relevant in a noninformed consent medical negligence claim? Evidence of this disclosure might be offered by plaintiff or defendant-physician if relevant to establishing compliance with or deviation from the standard of care. Keep in mind that relevance as defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence (and similar state rules) reflects a rather low bar to hurdle. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that "[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action."
301 "Essentially, Rule 401 requires that there be a logical relationship between the evidence sought to be introduced and a 'fact . . . of consequence' in the case." 302 It may, therefore, be reasonable to propose a logical connection between the information disclosed by the physician and the physician's recognition of the standard of care. The informed consent disclosure suggests that the physician is capable (or incapable) of understanding the treatment or procedure which has been recommended.
The FRE 401 inquiry does not end the analysis because not all relevant evidence is admissible, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." 303 A trial court may have concern that evidence of informed consent in a non-informed consent medical negligence trial might suggest to the jury that the plaintiff's awareness of risks and complications of a procedure or treatment indicates that the plaintiff consented to negligent treatment. 304 Under these circumstances, relevant evidence (the informed consent disclosure) is legitimately excluded from evidence pursuant to FRE 403. 308 At trial, over Plaintiff's objections, the trial court held that the informed consent disclosure was relevant to the standard of care. 309 Additionally, "the trial judge allowed the jury to review Plaintiff's informed consent documents as part of its deliberation." 310 The jury returned a defense verdict. On appeal, the appellate court noted that New Jersey case law had not yet addressed "the admissibility of informed consent evidence where the plaintiff has only asserted a claim of negligent treatment."
311 After reviewing the case law of various jurisdictions, the appellate court concluded that the informed consent evidence was inadmissible, and its admission was reversible error. 312 The appellate court essentially based its determination on a relevance analysis, including the danger that admissibility may lead the jury to believe that the patient's consent to the procedure implies consent to an injury.
313
Wilson 314 involved a medical negligence claim following complications of esophageal dilation, requiring reparative thoracic surgery. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant-physician performed an unnecessary procedure-Plaintiff neither claimed lack of informed consent nor did the defendant-physician raise an affirmative defense based on informed consent. 315 Defendant's counsel referred to informed consent during opening statement, cross-examined Plaintiff on this topic and referred to informed consent during defendant's direct examination. 316 The judge provided the jury a consent form to examine during deliberations and the jury returned a defense verdict.
317
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri identified the informed consent evidentiary issue as one of first impression. 318 After reviewing decisions from other jurisdictions 319 the court stated that it "joins the chorus of other state supreme courts and holds that evidence of alleged informed consent is irrelevant and can only mislead the jury in a medical malpractice case based on negligent performance of care and treatment." 320 In Brady v. Urbas, 321 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered this issue in a podiatry negligence case, not including an informed consent claim. The defendant-podiatrist performed four surgical procedures, obtaining Plaintiff's consent for each. Plaintiff alleged negligence in the last three procedures. At trial, Plaintiff moved in limine to exclude evidence of her surgical consents, based on relevance and prejudice. The judge denied the motion. The defendant-podiatrist had urged that the evidence was relevant to Plaintiff's "credibility as a witness and to her state of mind at the time of the surgeries." After a jury verdict for the defendant-podiatrist and a reversal on appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, noting that "the fact that a patient may have agreed to a procedure in light of the known risks does not make it more or less probable that the physician was negligent in either considering the patient an appropriate candidate for the operation or in performing it in the postconsent timeframe." 322 This, of course, is a relevance analysis pertaining to the podiatrist's conduct.
The Court of Appeals of Nebraska considered the same issue in Hillyer v. Midwest Gastrointestinal Associates. 323 Here, Plaintiff alleged that her colon was perforated during a colonoscopy performed by the defendant. 324 Additional serious complications resulted. 325 At trial, the court admitted evidence of the defendant's "discussions with [Plaintiff] and other patients regarding risks and complications associated with colonoscopies." 326 The defendant "was allowed to testify that with every patient, he goes through the list of complications and risks for the procedure, including perforations and the potential need for surgery." 327 Although the court of appeals did not adopt a per se rule of inadmissibility after reviewing the law of other jurisdictions, it did "hold, as a matter of first impression, that evidence of risk-of-procedure or risk-of-surgery discussions with the patient is generally irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial where the plaintiff alleges only negligence, and not lack of informed consent."
328 Therefore, the court of appeals holding implicates both the logical connection of the evidence to medical negligence and the potential prejudice to Plaintiff even if the evidence is relevant.
It is likely that the "substance" of the informed consent disclosure (discussion) can be admissible to prove the defendant-physician's knowledge or ignorance of the standard of care if the litigants simply are prohibited by the trial court from linking the proposed medical treatment/procedure, risks, and complications to the patient's consent in a non-informed consent case. In this fashion, the focus is on the physician's awareness of the applicable standard of care and the jury will not be inclined to believe that the patient "consented" to the alleged medical negligence.
329
IX. CONCLUSION
The intent of this paper is to explore the landscape of the unconventional aspects of informed consent, focusing primarily on the physician's duty to disclose. The law of informed consent has continued to develop since Canterbury v. Spence, 330 implicating issues certainly not contemplated more than forty-five years ago. I suspect the doctrine may continue to expand and yield scholarship on topics not previously examined in depth. In a sense, informed consent is a legal doctrine which intrudes on the practice of medicine. The case law discussed in this paper imposes disclosure requirements on physicians by courts-courts which, typically, are not students of medicine. 331 The results (overbreadth of the doctrine) are potentially disastrous for physicians and patients, as occurred some years ago in Wisconsin. 332 As the examination of informed consent continues, so should the analysis of whether true informed consent is possible or desired by most patients. For an accurate analysis, courts must be mindful of both medicine and the law. 331 . Of course, the court may interpret informed consent statutes, promulgated by legislators who, typically, are not students of medicine.
332. See Ginsberg, supra note 227.
